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The late Alfred Lindesmith was an Indiana University soci-
ology professor who was a long-time advocate of medical treat-
ment of addiction. We demonstrate below how the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) attempted to intimidate Lindesmith,
stifle his research, and interfere with his publication of articles
counter to FBN policies. In addition, we argue that the Ameri-
can banning of the 1946 Canadian film on drug addiction, Drug
Addict, may have been a pivotal event in a pattern of censorship
and disinformation carried on by the Federal Bureau of Narcot-
ics (FBN) under the leadership of its long-time Director, Harry
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Anslinger. The FBN's campaign to suppress information played
a significant role in the emerging public ideology and mythol-
ogy regarding drug addicts and drug addiction in the United
States. Lindesmith's unsuccessful efforts against the ban, as il-
lustrated by his personal papers, his FBN file recently released
to the National Archives, Anslinger's papers in the National Ar-
chives, and those recently released under the Freedom of In-
formation Act, demonstrate the nearly absolute control of
information exercised by the FBN.
We attempt to put in historical context the FBN campaign
to develop a prohibitive national drug control policy. As How-
ard Becker, who began unhindered public criticism of FBN-
inspired drug policies as early as 1963 with his famous mono-
graph, Outsiders,' recently observed: "I never actually understood
why Anslinger bothered with Lindesmith, who could have pub-
lished whatever he wanted without having the slightest effect on
policy. You can see that now when everyone under the sun is
publishing whatever they want . . . and it doesn't change a
thing."
2
We will attempt to answer Becker's question by demonstrat-
ing how the political and cultural context from the 1930s
through the early 1950s presented a vastly different situation for
critics of American drug control policies compared to later peri-
ods after a national drug policy was institutionalized.
II. LINDESMITH, THE SELF AND THE ADDICr
Lindesmith was a University of Chicago trained social psy-
chologist who received a Ph.D. in 1937. His training provided
him with a grounding in interactionist theory and concepts, a
method of analysis, a specific orientation toward data collection,
and a key contact to begin collection of dissertation data.
Lindesmith's five years at Chicago brought him into contact with
Herbert Blumer, whose research emphasized the role of the self
concept in human interaction.' Lindesmith also took courses
' HowARD BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SoCIoLocw oF DEVIANCE (1963).
'E-mail message from Howard Becker to John R Galliher (Aug. 28, 1995) (on file
withJohn F. Galliher).
3 See HERBERT BLUMER, SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 79 (1969).
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from Chicago sociologists Ernest Burgess and Louis Wirth, whose
research emphasized the critical role of fieldwork and the in-
depth treatment of qualitative data.4 During the early and mid-
1930s, the reputation of The Polish Peasant In Europe and America
by W.I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki5 was at its zenith at the
6University of Chicago. The book's emphasis on life history and
Znaniecki's subsequent development of inductive methods7 made
an indelible mark on Lindesmith's career. Lindesmith was also
close to criminologist Edwin Sutherland during Sutherland's
brief stay at Chicago (1932-35).8 As a result of this association,
Lindesmith became acquainted with drug addicts and addiction
through Broadway Jones, the subject for Sutherland's The Profes-
sional Thief9 Consequently, at Chicago, Lindesmith mastered a
theoretical orientation, was prevailed upon to collect qualitative
data in the field, became dedicated to inductive methods, and
was accorded valuable personal contacts which set his career on a
long-term path.
Lindesmith drew on the individual's self concept in his dis-
sertation and later in his SocialPsychology textbook.0 This concept
in turn made possible Lindesmith's distinction between physical
and psychological addiction. For physical addiction to develop
into psychological addiction, "the person's interpretation of his
own withdrawal distress is a crucial event.., made possible by the
existence -of language behavior and conceptual thought."" In
other words, a defining characteristic of all human beings is that
' See Louis WIRTH, THE GHETrO (1928); ROBERT E. PARK & ERNEST BURGESS, THE
CrIY (1925).
5 W.I. THoMAS & FLORIAN ZNANIECEI, THE POLISH PEASANT IN EUROPE AND AMERICA
(1919). Inductive methods involve reasoning from patterns in empirical observations
rather than an initial theoretical position.
6 HERBERT BLUMER, AN APPRAISAL OF THOMAS AND ZNANIECKI's: THE POLISH PEASANT
IN EUROPE AND AMERICA (1949).
7 SeegmneallyFLORIANZNANIECKI, THE METHOD OF SOCIOLOGY (1934).
a MARK GAYLORD &JOHN F. GALLuHER, THE CRIMINOLOGY OF EDWIN SUTHERLAND 104-
20 (1966).
9 EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, THE PROFESSIONAL THIEF (1937). Broadway Jones was
both a career thief and a long-time drug addict.
,0 ALFRED R. LINDESM1TH & ANSELm STRAUSS, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (rev. ed. 1966).





they have the capacity to see themselves as objects.12 When the
intellectual connection between discontinuing drug use and
withdrawal occurs, any initial euphoria from drug use "vanishes
and is replaced by the negative effect of relieving withdrawal dis-
tress." 3 Therefore, "the theory that only abnormal persons be-
come drug addicts is untenable." The proposition that addicts
are in all ways normal human beings made punitive drug prohi-
bitions seem less reasonable.'5 These ideas propelled Lindes-
mith's intense, lifelong, and narrowly focused intellectual and
political position.
A. ENTER HARRYANSLINGER
Lindesmith's views of human addiction and drug addicts
were diametrically opposed by those of Harry Anslinger and the
FBN.'r Around the same time that Lindesmith began his gradu-
ate training, a new American drug control policy began to take
shape through Anslinger's efforts. As a young man during World
War I and the 1920s, Anslinger worked in the foreign service and
served for several years in the in-fated Prohibition division of the
Department of the Treasury. 7 After scandal rocked the narcotics
sector of the Prohibition division in the late 1920s, Anslinger was
appointed head of the newly-created Federal Bureau of Narcotics
in 1930.18 The FBN was a division of the Treasury Department
designated to enforce drug control statutes drafted as tax meas-
ures. Anslinger remained at this post until his apparently forced
retirement in 1962.19 For decades writers have marveled at the ir-
rational direction of American drug policy after the creation of
,Id. at 423-28.
,3 Id at 352-53.
14 Id. at 356.
'5 ALFRED R. LINDESMiTH, THE ADDICr AND THE LAW (1965).
16 Id.
" JoHN MCWILLIAMS, THE PROTECORS: HARRY J. ANSUINGER AND THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF NARCOTICS (1938-1962), 32 (1990).
Id. at 42.
1' Id. at 180. There is some evidence to suggest that President Kennedy forced
Ansligner to retire in 1962.
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the FNB and the success of Anslinger in using law enforcement
to control public opinion regarding drug use and addiction.2°
The great migration of African-Americans to urban centers
in the North, coupled with the emergence of an illicit narcotics
market after the enactment of the Harrison Act of 1914, changed
the face of addiction in cities like Chicago, Detroit, and New
York.2' Beginning after World War I and through the 1940s,
there were wholesale demographic changes in the United States
which created public anxiety and suspicion directed at African-
Americans, immigrants, and Communists.2 During the Great
Depression of the 1930s, the expanding role of the federal gov-
ernment created an opportunity for Harry Anslinger to success-
fully exploit these fears by linking drugs to minorities. Anslinger
had great political power because he maintained the support of
both Democrats and Republicans, the Women's Christian Tem-
perance Union (WCTU), and many churches. Because the FBN
controlled the licenses for the importation of opiates, Anslinger
also received the support of drug companies.2 While exploiting
these fears and cultivating special interest groups, Anslinger also
utilized the demographic changes in the addict population, from
rural whites to urban dwellers, including a growing number of
minorities.24
Activities such as Anslinger's have been characterized as a
moral crusade.2' Ansligner was also a savvy bureaucrat during the
Great Depression of the 1930s who excelled at protecting his or-
ganization from budget cuts by locating new legislative man-
" See, e.g., DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARcoTIc CONTROL
(1973); RUFUS KING, THE DRUG HANG-UP: AMERICA'S FIFTY-YEAR FOLLY (1972); see also
MIcHAEL STARES, COCAINE FIENDS AND REEFER MADNESS: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF
DRUGS IN THE MOvIES 61-62 (1982) (observing that Anslinger controlled the film in-
dustry's depiction of addiction).
21 HAROLD FINESTONE, EPIDEMIOLOGY OF ADULT ADDICTION 142-45 (1962) (proceed-
ings of the White House Conference on Narcotics and Drug Abuse).
22 NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: TBE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND How
ITCHANGEDAMERICA323, 343-53 (1991).
' See generally McWILLIAMS, supra note 17, at 106.
21 Id. at 48-49, 52-53.
2See BECKER, supra note 1, at 145.
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dates.26 Above all Ansligner was a government operative, with ex-
perience in the intelligence community, who through political
harassment, adeptly controlled the flow of information on drug
addiction. According to Sloman, "[tlhe thing that Anslinger
concerned himself with a lot was the dissemination of informa-
tion. He completely disagreed with the free exchange of ideas on
the subject."27 Allen Ginsberg recalled that, even as late as the
1950s, it was difficult to publish books which referred to drugs or
drug use:
There was at the time [an] assumption: that if you talked about [drugs] on
the bus or the subway, you might be arrested-even if you were only dis-
cussing a change in the law... A decade later you still couldn't get away
with a national public TV discussion of the laws without the Narcotics Bu-
reau and the FCC intruding.... [T] he fear and terror ... was so real that
it had been internalized in the ... publishing industry, and so, before the
book could be published, all sorts of disclaimers had to be interleaved with
the text-lest the publisher be implicated criminally with the author.28
Foucault has described activities such as Anslinger's as "re-
gimes of truth."2 In such instances, truth becomes a function of
power rather than factual accuracy. Accordingly, we will demon-
strate that Anslinger and the FBN not only attempted to use their
legal authority to censor scientific inquiry they considered anti-
thetical to their interests, but sponsored "research" projects that
had preordained results more to their liking. Controlling the
drug discourse in this way allowed Anslinger and the Bureau to
be taken seriously-even while trading in patent untruths-and
in Foucault's terms "marginalized, derided, excluded and even
prohibited" any competing ideas.Y Thus, "[t]ruth is not sepa-
rated from power, rather it is one of the important vehicles and
expressions of power; power is exercised through the production
and dissemination of truth."3'
"See Donald T. Dickson, Bureaucracy and Morality: An Organizational Perspective on a
Moral Cnuzade, 16 Soc. PROBS. 143 (1968).
LARRY SLOMAN, REEFER MADNESS: HISTORY OF MARIJUANA IN THE UNITED STATES
199-200 (1983).
WIL.IAM BURROUGHS, JUNKY vii-viii (1977) (quoting introduction by Allen Gins-
berg).
9ALAN HUNT & GARYWICHAM, FOUCAULT AND THE LAW: TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF
LAwAND GOVERNANCE 11 (1994) (quoting Foucault).
SId. at 8-9.
3' Id. at 11.
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In the final analysis, Anslinger was not only a "moral entre-
preneur" or a "rule creator," but a "moral enforcer" as well. 2
This allowed Anslinger to play a significant and unique role in
creating an American "drug crisis." And in response to this drug
crisis, Anslinger was ideally placed to provide a law enforcement
response. In this fashion, he was able to guarantee himself, and
the FBN, an enormous amount of political influence and legal
power. Thus, Anslinger used his position in the FBN to define
and legitimize his interpretation of the drug problem, to mobi-
lize legislative initiatives, and to implement an official law en-
forcement plan of action, all of which Blumer argues is essential
in the creation of social problems.3
B. ANSLINGER'S ATTEMPTED CENSORSHIP AND NEUTRALIZATION OF
LINDESMITH'S EARLY RESEARCH
From the late 1930s to the early 1950s, the FBN concentrated
on the intimidation of Lindesmith. The targeting of Lindesmith
was possible because Lindesmith acted virtually alone in standing
up against federal drug control policies. Anslinger took his first
action against Lindesmith in 1939, not long after Lindesmith had
completed his Ph.D. dissertation. Anslinger asked the FBN Chi-
cago District Supervisor to inform Indiana University, Lindes-
mith's employer, that a drug addict and a "collection of
racketeers" were among the sponsors of a drug research organi-
zation (the World Narcotics Research Foundation), an organiza-
tion which IAndesmith publicly supported Thus, in response,
the FBN began a campaign of intimidation and guilt-by-
association against Lindesmith that would eventually span four
decades.
The FBN's campaign against Lindesmith gained momentum
in 1940 after Lindesmith published the Dope Fiend Mythology in
The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. In this article,
32 BECKER, supra note 1, at 147-62.
" See Herbert Blumer, Social Probiems as Collective Behavior, 18 SoC. PROBS. 298
(1971).
-" Letter from Harry J. Anslinger to James J. Biggins (Oct. 9, 1939) (on file with
John F. Galliher). Anslinger chose to attack Lindesmith for the first time at this point
because the World Narcotics Research Foundation publicly supported medical treat-
ment of addicts.
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Lindesmith criticized "stereotyped misinformation about drug
addicts" such as news stories "of the 'dope-crazed killer' or the
dope fiend rapist."5 This article so angered Harry Anslinger that
he arranged to have San Francisco Circuit Judge Twain Michel-
son write an attack in response,-6 later published in this same
journal37
Recently released FBN records, made public under the Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA), reveal that Anslinger consulted
with the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Herbert E. Gaston:
It is unfortunate that an article containing such misinformation and half-
truths should be carried in a magazine devoted to the education of law en-
forcement officers, [but] I do not wish to place the bureau on the level of
having to answer Lindesmith, and would like to have your suggestions as to
counteracting this vicious propaganda."
Mr. Gaston replied that Lindesmith's piece was nothing more
than an "apology for addiction written from the standpoint of an
addict. We might look for a college professor, a district attorney
or other lawyer, or a law professor to answer him." 9 Accordingly,
Anslinger recruited Judge Twain Michelson. Michelson's essay
associated the spread of addiction with Japanese imperialism as
well as a variety of crimes including "burglary, robbery, forgery,
rape and murder."40 As if all this were not enough to attempt to
discredit medical treatment of addicts, even nudism was associ-
ated with drug addiction. Judge Michelson concluded that
Lindesmith was a "pseudo-scientist."
41
3s Alfred R. Lindesmith, Dope Fiend Mythology, 31 J. CiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 199,
199 (1940).
'Letter from HarryJ. Anslinger to Judge Twain Michelson (Sept. 7, 1940) (on file
with John F. Galliher).
s7 Twain Michelson, Lindesmith Mythology, 31 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 375
(1940).
-" Memorandum from Harry Anslinger, Director, Federal Bureau of Narcotics, to
Herbert Gaston, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Treasury Dep't (Sept. 17, 1940) (on file with
John F. Galliher). Anslinger also noted that thejournal editor, Robert Gault, Professor
of Psychology at Northwestern University, "collaborate[d]" with Lindesmith, as reflected
in the fact that Lindesmith served as an advisory editor of thejournal. Id.
" Memorandum from Henry Gaston, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Treasury Dep't, to
Harry Anslinger, Director, Federal Bureau of Narcotics (no date) (on file with John F.
Galliher).
40 Michelson, supra note 37, at 383.
41 I at 400.
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In 1948, Lindesmith published an article in Federal Probation42
describing a case where the FBN allowed two affluent addicts to
receive opiates for over twenty years, in contravention of the Bur-
eau's avowed organizational mandate. This so outraged the FBN
that they demanded a "correction" by thatjournal.3
It was also believed by Lindesmith and others that the FBN
intended to plant narcotics in Lindesmith's house or automobile
to set him up for arrest. 4 In addition, an internal FBN memo
suggests that a secret tap may have been placed on Lindesmith's
phone by the Bureau.4 However, efforts to compromise Lindes-
mith were probably made more difficult because there is no rec-
ord that he ever advocated, possessed, or used illegal drugs.
Lindesmith did not have wide support in the academic
community for his antagonistic approach to the federal govern-
ment's drug policy. For over two decades most prominent aca-
demicians either ignored Lindesmith's work or criticized it
methodologically or substantivly.46 For example, Lindesmith's
theory of addiction was criticized for ignoring statistical informa-
tion and thereby failing to recognize that "addict criminality does
not result primarily from a desperate need to relieve withdrawal
sickness ... but rather from the desire for euphoria."47 But the
fact that others in the academic community did not join Lindes-
mith during the 1940s and 1950s is also attributable to the politi-
cal caution of his colleagues. Even more than his sociological
42 Alfred R. Lindesmith, Handling the Opiate Problem, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1948, at
23.
Letter from M.L Harney to HarryJ. Anslinger (Apr. 29, 1949) (on file with John
F. Galliher).
4 Letter from Alfred R. Lindesmith toJohn W. Ashton, Arts and Science Dean, In-
diana University (Feb. 24, 1949) (on file with John F. Galliher); see also Anselm
Strauss, Obituary for Alfred R. Lindesmith, ASA FOOTNOTES 13 (May 1991); Charles
Winick, Social Behavior, Public Policy, and Nonhanmful Drug Use, 69 MILANK Q. 437
(1991).
"Memorandum from George H. White to HarryJ. Anslinger (Nov. 22, 1954) (on
file withJohn F. Galliher).
46 SeeWilliam E. McAuliffe & Robert A. Gordon, A Test of Lindesmith's Theory of Ad-
diction: The Frequency of Euphoria Among Long-Term Addicts, 79 AM. J. Soc. 795 (1974);
Ralph Turner, The Quest fir Universals in Sociological Research, 18 AM. Soc. REv. 604
(1953); W.S. Robinson, The Logical Structure of Analytic Induction, 16 AM. Soc. REv. 812
(1951).
47 McAuliffe & Gordon, supra note 46, at 820.
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research, Lindesmith's challenge to government policy may have
served to isolate him from the mainstream of the profession.
Lindesmith's writing however, was not the only target of censor-
ship by Anslinger and the FBN, nor the only instance for conflict
between these two men.
III. ANSLINGER'S BANNING OF DRUGADDICT
In addition to FBN efforts to censor Lindesmith himself, the
Bureau targeted a film that embraced his theories.48 The film,
Drug Addict, is a 1946 documentary made by the Canadian Film
Board, with the assistance of the narcotics specialists in the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police.49 The film was intended to assist in the
training of law enforcement and medical professionals. The film
deals with the nature of drug addicts, addictive drugs, and drug
trafficking. It also advocates modest reform and reconciliation of
drug policy commensurate with the facts surrounding addiction.
Drug Addict won a Canadian Film Award and was cited as a
"bold, honest record of the drug traffic and its toll in human
misery. It is as honest as it is stark. The film treats drug addiction
as an illness and thus has run afoul of some who would condemn
as criminals all who use drugs. ,5 0 As a documentary, "the film ob-
jects to the use of the term 'dope fiend' in describing addicts,
most of whom are presented as sick and bewildered people."51
According to McWilliams, Anslinger banned Drug Addict because
the scenes of drug use and sales were "totally unacceptable" to
him.
A. MAJOR THEMES OF THE FILM
This section provides an overview of the major themes and
claims of The Drug Addict (1) that addicts and traffickers are re-
"' Note that the FBN was not predisposed to censor all films about drug use and
drug trafficking. For example, after checking the scripts of To the Ends of the Earth
(1948), andJohnny StoolPigeon (1949), the agency gave them its approval. STARKS, supra
note 20, at 61-62.
49 DRUGADDICr (Canadian Film Board 1946).
"Canadian Ministry of Information, Canadian Film Awards (Apr. 22, 1949).
U.S. Protest on Dope Film Stirs Canada, CHi. TRIB., circa Feb. 10, 1949 (on file with
John F. Galliher). A typed copy of this article was found in Lindesmith's files.
" McWnLLAMS, supra note 17, at 102.
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cruited from all races and classes; (2) that high-level drug traf-
fickers are white; (3) that law enforcement only targets low-level
dealers; (4) that addiction is a sickness; (5) that addiction to le-
gal and illegal drugs are essentially the same; (6) that cocaine is
not necessarily addictive; and (7) that law enforcement control
of drugs is in the final analysis impossible.
1. Addicts are Recruited From All Races and Classes
"Contrary to popular belief, the traffic in drugs and the use
of drugs is fostered by no one race. Drugs affect all races and
classes of people. 53 Possibly to emphasize this perspective, Drug
Addict depicts affluent whites injecting drugs, appearing in police
lineups, and congregating on the street. The narrator says: "Ad-
diction is by no means confined to the criminal class who are best
known because of the exposed lives they lead. But there are
many who do not need to buy from peddlers, who have found a
means of diverting legal drugs to their own use."54 At this point, a
well-groomed man in a darkened room is shown holding a hypo-
dermic needle.
Given Lindesmith's charges of bureau accommodation to af-
fluent addicts in the Federal Probation article, 5 this scene undoubt-
edly made the FBN uncomfortable, and encouraged and
contributed to the censoring.
2. High-Level Drug Traffickers are White
"The source of each city's supply of drugs is the man with the
connection. His position is remote from the sale of drugs to the
addict. He is in business and he is concerned with profits."56 This
is illustrated by a rotund white man, puffing on a cigar. This im-
age of a high level drug trafficker contradicted Anslinger's efforts
to associate drug trafficking with minorities.
3 DRUGADDICr, supra note 49.
54 Id.
"See I.NDESMITH, supra note 42.
56 DRUGADDIM, supra note 49.17 See HARRY J. ANSLINGER & WILLIAM F. TOMPEKINS, THE TR-AFC IN NARCOTICS
(1953); MusTO, supra note 20, at 221; McWILLAMS, supra note 17, at 52.
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3. Law Enforcement Only Attempts to Control Low-Level Street Dealers
The peddler is the chief target of enforcement officers. He operates more
or less in the open trusting his wits to keep him from being caught with
drugs on his person. At the other end of such a remote network behind
him are the men who supply the entire country with drugs.
5 8
Even the street dealers shown are white. Since the major drug
traffickers are the source of the drug problem, Anslinger would
have taken exception to the claim that the FBN ignored their ac-
tivities.
4. Drug Addiction is a Sickness
Drugs will bring the addict] little real pleasure, but he will need them just
to feel normal ..... But a cure by oneself is seldom if ever possible .....
An addict must have his drug several times a day or he becomes very sick.
It is a habit he must satisfy. He has no choice [and] an average habit with
drugs bought from peddlers cost an addict as much as ten thousand dol-
lars a year [in 1946]. Not manyjobs can support an addiction. Those who
buy illegal drugs steal to get the money... [while] very seldom does an
addict commit a crime of violence. To the man addicted to opiates the
term dope fiendjust does not apply.
Dope Fiend Mythology was the title of Lindesmith's 1940 article that
so infuriated Anslingerr
5. Illegal Drugs Cannot be Distinguished from
the Problem of Addiction to Other drugs
"Drugs are just one form of addiction," like "[i]ntemperate
use of alcohol, [and] barbiturates."61 Anslinger likely despised
any linkage of drug laws to the failed alcohol prohibition.
Anslinger had worked in the much maligned Prohibition division
of the Treasury Department during the 1920s.62
6. Cocaine is Not Necessarily Addictive
"[C] ocaine [is] also a forbidden drug differing greatly from
opium. Lack of it does not cause sickness and in that sense it is
not habit-forming. Addicts who sometimes use it say it is just like
- DRUGADDICr, supra note 49.
59 Id.
'o See Lindesmith, supra note 35.
'a DRuGADDICT, supra note 49.
62 McWI.LIAMS, supra note 17; see also supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
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ice cream. Nice if you can have it, but you can do without it."6
Although Lindesmith argued that cocaine is not as addictive as
opiates,6' Anslinger never acknowledged the varying qualities of
illegal narcotics-relying instead on the simple message that all
illegal drugs were equally dangerous and equally addictive.6
7. Law Enforcement Control is Impossible
"Complete control of the traffic in drugs is impossible ...
[and] despite strict surveillance of customs officers and the clos-
est international cooperation of enforcement agencies, the illicit
traffic is heavier than that for legal use.""" Anslinger clearly re-
jected the notion that stopping the flow of illegal drugs was im-
possible.67 If Anslinger accepted the impossibility of completely
stopping the flow of drugs into the United States, he would have
admitted a weakness of his Bureau.
Anslinger knew of the potential political hazards which Drug
Addict could engender if the public was presented with such a re-
buttal-particularly one produced with the assistance of a gov-
ernment as credible as Canada and its national police force.
Indeed, Anslinger wrote that he would "strongly urge" the Cana-
dian government not to allow the film to be sent to the United
States.68 Showing this film, Anslinger claimed, "would do incalcu-
lable damage in the way of spreading drug addiction."69
Furthermore, he specifically refused to consider the possibil-
ity that any modifications in the film might make it more accept-
able*70 One of Anslinger's assistants complained that the film
minimized the significance of law enforcement and left the im-
pression that a "hospital cure" was the only effective response to
6DRUGADDICr, supra note 49.
"ALFRED R. LINDEsMr, OPIATE ADDICIION 74 (1947).
6DRUGADDIcr, supra note 49.
6"id.
67 ANsiNGER & ToMPIaNs, supra note 57.
"FBN Memorandum from Harry J. Anslinger (Oct. 19, 1948) (on file with Na-
tional Archives).
"Letter from HarryJ. Anslinger to Eric Johnston, President, Motion Picture Ass'n
of America, Inc. (Feb. 28, 1950) (on file with National Archives).




addiction. 7' Another FBN agent complained that the person who
has
no medical need for narcotics and who secure [s] their drugs from under-
world sources or in an illegal manner, is presented as a person muchly
wronged by society and unjustly denied free and easy access to such unlim-
ited supply of dangerous drugs as his own carnal craving demands ....
The addicts shown in the picture are so presented as to excite the sympa-
thy of the uninformed public.n
For Anslinger the ultimate proof that the film was "on the wrong
side" was Lindesmith's support for it.73
In February of 1949, a Canadian government representative
indicated to Lindesmith that Harry Anslinger had requested that
the Canadian government not distribute Drug Addict in the
United States. 74 Furthermore, Anslinger had the temerity to re-
quest that the Canadian government censor its film even within
its own borders. The Canadian government rejected his re-
quest.75 Short of a total ban, Anslinger demanded that Lindes-
mith be prohibited from viewing the film in Canada.76 The
Canadian government rejected this request as well, noting that:
"we [can]not bind ourselves to any agreement that no United
States citizen should ever see the film in Canada."
IV. LINDESMITH'S RESPONSE
Lindesmith recognized the importance of the film not only
for its intended purpose and audience, but also for its specific
and damning rebuttal of the misinformation campaign carried
out by Anslinger and the FBN. This was particularly appealing to
7' Letter from M.L. Harney to HarryJ. Anslinger (Oct. 18, 1948) (on file with Na-
tional Archives).
7 Letter from Garland H. Williams to Harry J. Anslinger (Oct. 18, 1948) (on file
with National Archives).
FBN Memorandum from Harry J. Anslinger (May 11, 1949) (on file with Na-
tional Archives).
7' Letter from KC. Hossick to Alfred R Lindesmith (Feb. 22, 1949) (on file with
John F. Galliher).
' Letter from Hume Wrong, Canadian Ambassador, to HarryJ. Anslinger (Mar. 27,
1950) (on file with National Archives).
'7 Letter from Harry J. Anslinger to Col. C.H.L. Sharman (Jan. 18, 1951) (on file
with National Archives).
7Letter from G.D.M. Cameron, Deputy Minister of National Health, to Harry J.
Anslinger (Jan. 12, 1951) (on file with National Archives).
674 [Vol. 88
THE WAR ONDRUGS
Lindesmith, since he was nearly the sole opposition to Anslinger
at that time and correctly identified the potential vulnerability of
the FBN position on narcotics control if Drug Addict were to be
distributed in the United States. Indeed, Lindesmith took a sab-
batical leave in order to view the film in Ottawa and to orches-
trate opposition to the ban,78 with the support of Raymond
Spottiswoode, the film editor of the Saturday Review of Literature.7
Lindesmith attempted to alert others to the impending cen-
sorship, but he failed to secure wide support. Many of the people
Lindesmith contacted were either intimidated or complacent.
For example, Victor H. Evjen, the managing editor of Federal Pro-
bation, expressed little interest in providing a public forum for
discussion of the censorship or the banning of the film. He
stated, "I have been told that the Canadian Government is not
satisfied with certain phases of the film and at present is making
some changes."80
However, Lindesmith was able to garner the support of the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in this dispute. The
ACLU demanded that Anslinger explain his actions."' Similarly,
Lindesmith's congressional representative, Andrew Jacobs, was
also supportive, but had no power to reverse the ban. Nonethe-
less, in a 1949 letter to Anslinger, Congressman Jacobs ques-
tioned the FBN's authority to censor film:
The truth of the matter is there is no idea that is dangerous.... There has
been entirely too much spoken and written in recent years about danger-
ous ideas... you cannot progress by trying to put ideas injail.... One of
the greatest dangers of government is that the hierarchy of government
shall determine that certain questions are no longer debatable... and
employ an illegal power which is expressly denied them."
' Letter from Alfred R. Lindesmith to Paul Martin (May 17, 1949) (on file with
John F. Galliher).
" Letter from Raymond Spottiswoode to Alfred R. Lindesmith (Feb. 16, 1949) (on
file with John F. Galliher); Raymond Spottiswoode, The Film Forum, SAT. REV.
LTEATURE, Mar. 26, 1949, at 41.
' Letter from Victor Ejen to Alfred R. Lindesmith (Mar. 8, 1949) (on file with
John F. Galliher).
" Letter from Herbert M. Levy, ACLU Staff Counsel, to G.W. Cunningham, FBN
Acting Director (Mar. 27, 1950) (on file with National Archives).




In his reply to Representative Jacobs, Anslinger falsely
claimed that the film had been banned under the code of the
motion picture producers and directors. 3 The Motion Picture
Association of America denied taking such action on the film.8
Lindesmith further incurred the wrath of the FBN by publishing
a rebuttal in the New York Times, which revealed that Anslinger
had lied when he said that the Drug Addict could not be shown in
the United States because it violated the Code of the Motion Pic-
ture Industry.
Additionally, noting that, contrary to the FBN's claim, the
Motion Picture Association had not banned the film, Lindesmith
wrote to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and implored him to
lift the ban single-handedly imposed by Anslinger.?6 The De-
partment of State replied through Otis Mulliken, the Acting Divi-
sion Chief to the United Nations for Economic and Social Affairs,
who said:
At Mr. Anslinger's request, the Department informed the Canadian De-
partment of External Affairs that the Commissioner of Narcotics objected
strongly to the showing of the film anywhere in the United States because
the position it takes concerning the handling of the problem of drug ad-
diction is contrary to the long-established policy of the United States....
The Public Health Service concurred in the attitude of the Commissioner
of Narcotics.87
Lindesmith, however, wanted to know who was specifically re-
sponsible for imposing the ban,s but the State Department re-
fused to identify the person at the Public Health Service who
had agreed with Anslinger.9
" Letter from Harry J. Anslinger to Rep. Andrew Jacobs (Mar. 3, 1949) (on file
withJohn F. Galliher).
4 Letter from Joseph I. Breen, Vice President and Director, Motion Picture Ass'n
of America, to Alfred R. Lindesmith (Aug. 9, 1949) (on file with John F. Galliher).
' Alfred R. Lindesmith, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TMEas,Jan. 22, 1950, at 12.
8 Letter from Alfred R. Lindesmith to Secretary of State Dean Acheson (June 2,
1949) (on file with John F. Galliher).
" Letter from Otis E. Mulliken to Alfred R. Lindesmith (June 30, 1949) (on file
withJohn F. Galliher).
' Letter from Alfred R. Lindesmith to Otis E. Mulliken (July 7, 1949) (on file with
John F. Galliher).




Another government official, John L. Thurston, Acting Ad-
ministrator of the Federal Security Agency of the Public Health
Service, unintentionally revealed the source of the effort to stifle
the film's distribution, when he advised Lendesmith that "as far
as we are able to discover the [Public Health] Service took no
part in arriving at the decision to ban the fllm."' ° This exchange
of letters convinced Lindesmith that the FBN was solely responsi-
ble for the ban of the Drug Addict. It also affirmed the inability or
unwillingness of other government officials to intervene.
The resistance that Lindesmith encountered during his cam-
paign to air Drug Addict reveals that his perception of the ad-
dicted person, and his theory of addiction were under fire. The
President of the Women's Christian Temperance Union (in Indi-
ana), an organization which had a long association with Anslin-
ger, personally cautioned Lindesmith:
Information has come to me that you are advocating the use of the Cana-
dian film The Drug Addict in this country. While I am not familiar with the
whole text of the film, it is my understanding that the drug addict is de-
picted as a sick person rather than a criminal. Surely, we would want noth-
ing which would break down the legislation bearing on this subject ....
We trust you will discontinue your effort to have this film shown in the
United States.9'
This letter, perhaps inadvertently, outlined exactly the course that
Anslinger had charted for national drug policy from the begin-
ning of his appointment in 1930. Anslinger deemed the addict a
criminal and viewed opposition, such as the film, as a threat to
the FBN policy of encouraging legislative efforts to stiffen drug
penalties. At the time, the suppression of Drug Addict was consid-
ered by Anslinger and Lindesmith to be a key act in the drama
surrounding the national drug control strategy. It was potentially
a public relations obstacle for Anslinger's legislative agenda,
while a rare opportunity for Lindesmith to halt the advancement
of prohibitionist policies.
Such an important threat merited every possible precaution
by Anslinger. It was predictable that his future attacks on
90 Letter from John L. Thurston to Alfred P. Lindesmith (Aug. 22, 1949) (on file
with John F. Galliher).
9' Letter from Mrs. Herman Stanley to Alfred R. Lindesmith (July 1, 1949) (on file
with John F. Galliher).
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Lindesmith were neither superficial nor timid. For example, in
official correspondence, Anslinger referred to Lindesmith as a
"crackpot."9 2 Similarly, in a complaint to the Indiana Board of
Regents, Mrs. Hamilton Wright, the wife of a long-time govern-
ment narcotics official who replaced her husband as a narcotics
representative to international missions, condemned Lindes-
mith'sJanuary 22, 1950, letter to the New York Times.93 In his let-
ter to the New York Times, Lindesmith focused on the hypocrisy of
the FBN's policy in suppressing the film:
This incident suggests that the public is informed and misinformed in this
field because of the control exercised over the mass media of communica-
don by the policemen-bureaucrats of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.
The same men who automatically deny to professional people in the
United States the right to see a sober, unsensational, and honest educa-
tional film on drug addiction promote cheap radio thrillers and sensa-
tional and inaccurate Hollywood productions on the same subject.
Another woman wrote to the Indiana University President
and to the Chair of the Indiana House and Senate Appropria-
tions Committees:
It is quite likely that this professor, who so flagrantly and vehemently at-
tacks the United States Government for its narcotic law enforcement in
the public prints, would also take the opportunity to spread his dangerous
views in the classroom-thus corrupting future generations and hiding
behind the cloak of academic freedom."
Lindesmith was obviously energized by this issue for he, like
Anslinger, concluded that the film presented an opportunity to
rebut the claims of the American government with information
endorsed and supported by an organization with an impeccable
and irreproachable reputation-the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police. In response, Anslinger was so alarmed that he formally
", Letter from HarryJ. Anslinger to Hume Wrong, Canadian Ambassador (Jan. 24,
1950) (on file with National Archives). Even prior to the conflicts over the film,
Anslinger had called Lindesmith's work "trash," based as it was on "[t]he self-serving
statements of the addicts--including a good proportion of 'leg pulling.'" See Letter
from HarryJ. Anslinger to Pablo Wolff (Aug. 28, 1941) (on file with National Archives);
Letter from HarryJ. Anslinger to Major William Coles, Home Office, London (Nov. 23,
1948) (on file with National Archives).
" Letter from Mrs. Hamilton Wright to Indiana University Board of Regents (Jan.
31, 1950) (on file withJohn F. Galliher). See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
Lindesmith, supra note 85, at 12.
"Letter from Mrs. L.E. Goetzke to Herman Wells, Indiana University President
(Feb. 25, 1950) (on file with National Archives).
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requested information from J. Edgar Hoover regarding the pos-
sibility that Lindesmith was a "member of any Communist-Front
organizations," since two members of the Canadian Film Board,
which had produced the film, had been identified as Soviet
96spies. The answer, if slow in coming, was positive. After
Lindesmith arranged a visit by controversial poet Allen Ginsberg
to the Indiana University campus, an FBN agent officially identi-
fied Lindesmith as a member of the 'W.E.B. DuBois Club
[which] has been declared a Communist organization."97
By the mid-to-late 1950s, due to the long-time harassment of
medical professionals, many physicians and lawyers gathered be-
hind Lindesmith and helped him form a commission to investi-
gate the drug problem. This effort produced a joint report
authored by a committee composed of representatives of both
the American Bar Association (ABA) and the American Medical
Association (AMA), which Lindesmith edited and arranged to
have published by the Indiana University Press.8 The Commit-
tee's findings were critical of the FBN policies and concurred
with much of what Lindesmith had been saying about addiction
since 1937.9 Anslinger attempted to suppress the publication of
the report by the Indiana University Press. Apparently, FBN
agents made inquiries into the reasons for publication, whether
public monies were being used, the number of copies to be
printed, and how the distribution was to be financed.10° These
were the type of tactics which had been previously used to in-
timidate the Russell Sage Foundation and dissuade tlat organi-
zation from its original plan to publish the ABA-AMA report.101
There is even evidence that Anslinger threatened to annul the
'6 Letter from HarryJ. Anslinger toJ. Edgar Hoover, FBI Director (Feb. 28, 1950)
(on file with National Archives).
Letter from F.M. Rankin,Jr. to Charles G. Ward, FBN District Supervisor (Mar. 7,
1966) (on file with National Archives). The W.E.B. DuBois Club was named for a
black sociologist accused of being a member of the Communist Party during the
McCarthy era. Ginsberg's visit to Indiana University was in 1966.
9' SeeDRUGADDICIZON: CRIME oRDISAE? (Alfred R. Lindesmith ed., 1961).
9 Id. at 163, 170.
L0 IANDEsmH, supra note 15, at 246; McWjAMs, supra note 17, at 118.
10, LNDESMrrH, supra note 15, at 246; KING, supra note 20, at 173-74; McWIIAMS,
supra note 17, at 118.
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Sage Foundation's tax-free status if they published the account of
the joint committee's findings.10 2
In response to the publication of the ABA-AMA report, the
FBN produced a rebuttal report."' The FBN used the same
name, format, and layout as the ABA-AMA report to create con-
fusion and minimize the impact of the joint report on the pub-
lic. 10 4 Indeed, the genuine ABA-AMA report ultimately had little
impact on the public or lawmakers. By the late 1950s, even the
highly prestigious joint committee could not garner any signifi-
cant political support for rethinking the criminal prohibition of
addictive drugs, both because by this time the American public
was angry and frightened by the specter of addicts and traffickers,
and because Congress had already set its future course by dra-
matically augmenting the penalties for narcotic offenses in 1951,
and again in 1956 following the suppression of the DrugAddict.
V. SUMMARYAND CONCLUSIONS
The potential impact of the film Drug Addict, which is still
technically banned, is now only a matter of conjecture. All that is
clear is that Anslinger and Lindesmith felt that the film could be
a significant influence on American perceptions of drug use and
drug addiction. As a documentary film, almost naive in tone and
unsophisticated in its articulation of narcotics addiction, it is a
relic. Yet striking themes continue to emanate from the film,
particularly its challenge to the racial bias that bolstered FBN
rhetoric and to that organization's assertion of the criminal status
of the addict. Drug Addict depicts all the addicts as white, well-
dressed urbanites. At no time do any of the addicts commit vio-
lent crimes or otherwise behave viciously. Instead, the addicts are
portrayed as desperate, pathetic, and sick individuals, suffering
from guilt and withdrawal distress. Furthermore, the film ques-
tions enforcement of tough drug laws. The Drug Addictjeopard-
" See Arts and Science: Indiana University College of Arts and Science-Graduate
School Alumni Association Newsletter 3 (1980); Letter from William Chambliss to
John F. Galliher (Dec. 3, 1994) (on file with John F. Galliher).
"s COMMENTS ON NARCOTIC DRUGS: INTERIM REPORT OFTHEJOINT COMMrIl=E OF THE
ABA AND THE AMA ON NARcoTIc DRUGS (1959).
"' SLOMAN, supra note 27.
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ized the very existence of the FBN, the control of the public dis-
course, and the flow of ideas that were essential to government
victories in the American war on drugs.
For his perspective on drugs, Lindesmith endured three dec-
ades of harassment by Anslinger and the FBN, while he was
largely ignored in reputable academic circles. By the 1960s, the
academic community had finally caught up with Lindesmith's
ideas. Unfortunately, by this time draconian drug control poli-
cies had become institutionalized. Since the 1960s, few crimi-
nologists or criminal law professors have supported government
drug policies. To this day, those setting American drug policy
continue to ignore expert legal, academic, and medical advice.'0 5
In the academic community there is now a clear recognition of
long-standing patterns of both the ineffectiveness of, and racism
inherent in, American drug law enforcement.' 6 Indeed, opposi-
tion to contemporary American drug control policy has become
normative in the academic community. For example, Zimring
and Hawkins demonstrate that while drug policy researchers may
disagree on the best method of dealing with drug abuse, they
107
nearly all agree that the current policy is an abject failure.
The 1946 film, Drug Addict, in hindsight, appeared to be the
last and best chance to create a rational and humane policy on
narcotics. Following the banning of the film, Anslinger and the
FBN were twice able to convince Congress to stiffen drug penal-
ties and thus set the nation on a course that has led to its current
failed drug policy. Only Lindesmith initially recognized the ur-
gency of the situation and was willing to distinguish the possible
policy alternatives that were available and necessary. Had
Lindesmith been more successful in opposing the ban, it is con-
"5 See MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL
JusTcE SYSTEM: FwE YEARS LATER (1995); C1IRISTNAJ. JOHNS, POWER, IDEOLOGY, AND
THE WAR ON DRUGS: NOTHING SUCEEs LIKE FAILURE (1992); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING &
GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL DRUG CONTROL (1992). All these schol-
ars agree that American prison populations are growing rapidly, primarily as to black
offenders, and in disproportion to involvement with illegal drugs by blacks.
,6 See, e.g., MAUER & HuLJNG, supra note 105; JOHNS, supra note 105; ZnaMING &
HAWKmNS, supra note 105.
' ZIMRING & HAWNs, supra note 104.
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ceivable that punitive drug policies would not have become
firmly entrenched in our nation's laws.
